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UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
State of California v.
U.S. Department of the Navy,
___F. 2d____, 88 D.A.R. 5258,
No. 86-1972
(9th Cir. Apr. 27, 1988).
FederalCourt Has No Jurisdiction
for Suit Brought by State to
Enforce Clean Water Act
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has held that the State of California
may not bring a suit under 33 U.S.C.
section 1319(d) to enforce the Clean
Water Act, by seeking civil damages in
federal court. The state's sole remedy is
a suit in state court under state law,
using the state's delegated authority to
enforce the Act.
The state brought suit against the
Navy for violating its discharge permit
in San Francisco Bay. It sought recovery
of civil penalties under sections 505 and
309 of the Clean Water Act, and under
state Water Code sections 13385 and
13386. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the
state is not a "citizen" entitled to bring
suit under section 505; that section 309's
enforcement powers are vested solely in
the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA); and that the
Act creates no independent jurisdictional
basis to allow a federal suit against a
federal agency by a state.
The Ninth Circuit, per Judges Choy,
Goodwin, and Tang, affirmed on appeal.
The issue of section 505 coverage was
dropped after the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision limiting that section to ongoing,
as opposed to wholly past, violations in
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, -U.S.,
108 S.Ct. 376, 384-85
(1987). The court held that section 309,
which permits up to $10,000 per day in
civil penalties, may be invoked only by
the EPA Administrator. In addition, the
court rejected the argument that the
state's delegated authority to enforce the
Clean Water Act in lieu of the EPA if it
has an enforcement plan approved by
the EPA, provides an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction. The court held
that the state was limited to bringing
suit in state court for violations of the
state law and regulations.
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UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT
Badham v. Eu,
88 D.A.R. 5216, No. C-83-1126 RHS
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1988).
CaliforniaCongressionalRedistricting
Does Not Violate Equal Protection
A three-judge panel of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District
of California has held that the congressional districts created by the California
legislature in 1982 do not violate the
equal protection clause and that the
plaintiffs (Republican congressional representatives and certain registered California Republicans) could not allege
facts to support their claims.
Following the 1980 census results,
the California legislature passed AB 301
in September 1981, which redistricted
the state in order to accommodate an
increase in congressional seats in the
U.S. House of Representatives. The
Republicans immediately began a petition drive to subject the legislation to
referendum. They were successful and
the matter was placed on the June 1982
ballot. In collateral litigation, the California Supreme Court ordered that the
challenged districts be used for the June
1982 and November 1982 elections because they were the only practical alternative. The referendum was approved
by the voters in June, and the redistricting was nullified.
In the November 1982 general election, 28 Democrats and 17 Republicans
were elected to Congress under the AB
301 districts. In that same election,
Republican George Deukmejian was
elected Governor, defeating Democrat
Tom Bradley. The Democrats called a
special session in December 1982, drafted reapportionment legislation which
was essentially identical to the districts
drawn in AB 301, and had the law (AB
2X) signed by the departing Governor
Brown.
This action challenging AB 2X was
filed shortly thereafter, alleging both
federal constitutional and state grounds.
A three-judge panel was convened for
the federal constitutional challenge. The
panel immediately invoked abstention
to allow the state courts to determine
the state issues, which might obviate
the need for a decision on the federal
grounds. Procedural battles ensued without conclusive result.
In the meantime, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Davis v.

(Summer 1988)

h
Bandemer, _U.S.106 S.Ct. 2797
(1986), in which it held that a constitutional equal protection claim alleging
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable,
with certain standards for determining
what constituted a violation.
The three-judge panel then took up
this case on an amended complaint and
a motion to dismiss by defendants. The
panel, per Judges Poole and Zirpoli,
held that the challenged redistricting did
not meet the "threshold effects" test of
Davis v. Bandemer, and on the facts as
alleged could not do so. Although the
Supreme Court in Davis issued no
majority opinion, the panel was able
to discern the following test from the
plurality. A plaintiff in an equal protection challenge to alleged gerrymandering
must show: (1)discriminatory intent;
and (2) a threshold showing of discriminatory effect including both (a) an
actual or projected history of disproportionate results, and (b) strong indicia of
a lack of political power and denial of
fair representation. The threshold showing requires more than mere failure to
meet mathematical expectations, or differential difficulty in winning elections.
The panel found sufficient allegations of discriminatory intent. The panel
found that there was some disproportionate impact, by comparing the number of votes received by each party to
the number of resulting representatives.
However, each side hotly contested
whether receiving 40% of the seats while
receiving 47-50% of the votes case rose
to the level of seriousness to require
judicial intervention.
The panel avoided the question by
holding that regardless of the seriousness, the Republicans could not meet
their burden on the second prong of the
effects test: lack of political power. The
court held that there were not, and
could not be, any allegations that the
Republican party had been "shut out'
of the political process" or that the
political process had been inhibited in
any way or that any limitations had
been placed on Republican participation. Although disproportionate representation might suffice for the first
prong, a higher showing is required for
the second prong.
The panel dismissed with prejudice
and denied leave to amend, and noted
that the Republicans could not allege an
utter failure of the political process or
total lack of political power. The panel
cited, inter alia, the Republicans'
success in capturing 40% of the seats,
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which prevents their being ignored in
Congress; the fact that Republicans hold
the Governor's chair, one of the two
U.S. Senate seats, and have for seven
years controlled the White House; and
their success in swiftly overturning the
first redistricting at the polls. The panel
held that, under these facts, "California
Republicans represent so potent a political force that it is unnecessary for the
judiciary to intervene...to protect the
rights of a disadvantaged political or
racial minority."
In addition, the court rejected causes
of action alleging that the redistricting
plan violated the one-person, one-vote
requirement, the Republicans' first
amendment rights, or the constitutional
guarantee of a "Republican Form of Government." The court found no precedent
or facts to support the averments made.
The case has been appealed, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has denied a petition for expedited proceedings.
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
Walters v. Weed,
___Cal.3d___ 88 D.A.R. 5369,
No. S.F. 25130 (April 28, 1988).
Students May Vote According to
PriorAddress Where That Address Has
Been Abandoned as Domicile,
But No New Domicile is Established
The California Supreme Court has
turned down a challenge to the 1983
Santa Cruz City Council election based
on alleged illegal votes cased by students.
The court held that although a student
may have left a domicile without any
intention of returning, that address remains the voter's lawful address for
voting purposes, until a new, permanent
domicile is established.
In the 1983 election for four seats on
the Santa Cruz City Council, Jane Weed
received the fourth highest number of
votes. The sixth-place finisher had 145
fewer votes than Weed. (The fifth-place
finisher was, for mathematical reasons,
irrelevant to the case.) Based on a Santa
Cruz County Grant Jury report that
found voting irregularities in the four
on-campus precincts at the University of
California at Santa Cruz (UC Santa
Cruz), plaintiffs, a group of individual
citizens, contested Weed's election, alleging that 472 voters, all students at
UC Santa Cruz, cast illegal votes. They
produced 292 voters at trial, 193 of
whom testified that although they had
formerly been domiciled and registered
to vote at on-campus address and precincts, they had returned in the fall of

1983 with the intention of seeking new,
off-campus housing. Under Election
Code section 200(b), a person's domicile
is defined as that place in which the
person's habitation is fixed, where the
person intends to stay, and to which the
person intends to return when away.
Alleging the voters no longer met the
third part of the test, plaintiffs sought
to invalidate the votes, and declare the
sixth-place finisher the true winner.
Pursuant to a stipulation between
the parties which was not at issue on
appeal, the trial court determined that
182 illegal votes were necessary to set
aside the election results and declare the
sixth-place finisher the winner. The trial
court found that of the 193 who testified
they returned to school with the intention of finding off-campus housing, 113
had acquired new domiciles the month
before the election, and had voted illegally at their old domiciles. However,
that was insufficient to swing the election. The other 80 were found not to
have established new domiciles and so
to have lawfully voted according to their
old addresses.
The appellate court reversed, holding
that everyone who had left their old
domiciles was ineligible to vote at the
old address, regardless of whether or
not they had established new domiciles
for voting purposes. The court held that
the failure to meet all of the standards
in section 200(b) rendered the votes
illegal.
The Supreme Court, per Justices
Panelli, Mosk, Broussard and Arguelles,
reversed. The court held that although
the precise terms of section 200(b)
would seem to invalidate the domiciles
and hence the votes, that was the beginning and not the end of the analysis. In
particular, the court looked also to sections 243 and 244 of the Government
Code, which define legal residence, and,
according to the court, "rest on the well
established principle that every person
has in law a domicile or...'everybody

belongs somewhere." The court reasoned that the statutory scheme contained a
gap, in that persons who had left a prior
residence but had not yet established a
new permanent domicile would be without a domicile under the Election Code,

but would necessarily have one under
the Government Code. The court held
that to adopt the appellate court's reasoning would effectively disenfranchise
those who were in the process of moving, and so adopted a different alternative to fill the gap: a person may vote
at his/her prior residence, even if it has
been abandoned without the intent to

return, if the person has not yet established a new residence in which he/she
intends to remain.
The court buttressed its reasoning by
noting that this solution was less likely
to permit voter fraud or "precinct shopping" than the appellate court's alternative, because a person could not set up
a residence shortly before the election
solely for the purpose of voting. Moreover, the court pointed out that the
lower court's decision would heavily
impact upon students, who generally are
between domiciles in the summer months
and early fall when voter registration
takes place. Prior cases establish that
voting requirements which fall disproportionately upon and disenfranchise
young adults or students are unconstitutional.
Evangelatos v. Superior Court,
-Cal.3d___,
88 D.A.R. 4984,
No. S000194 (April 21, 1988).
Proposition51 Is Constitutional
and Operates Only Prospectively
The California Supreme Court has
upheld Proposition 51, which limits joint
and several liability for noneconomic
damages, against a facial constitutional
challenge based on due process and
equal protection. At the same time, the
court limited the measure's effect only
to those causes of action which accrue
after its passage, holding it has no
impact on pending cases.
Proposition 51 was passed by the
voters at the June 6, 1986 primary
election. It alters the common law rule
that joint tortfeasors are jointly and
severally liable for all damages regardless of fault. Under Proposition 51,
codified at Civil Code sections 14311431.5, defendants are jointly liable for
all economic damages suffered by the
plaintiff, but severally liable for noneconomic damages, as determined by
the degree of fault found by the jury.
(For a full explanation of Proposition
51 and the facts of the Evangelatos case,
see CRLR Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1987)
p. 137.)
The Supreme Court, per Justices
Arguelles, Mosk, Broussard and Panelli,
joined in concurrence by Justices Kaufman, Eagleson and Anderson sitting by
designation, held that the law does not
violate either the due process or equal

protection clauses of the state or federal
constitutions. Briefly, the law is not
unconstitutionally vague; ambiguities
exist in every statute and it is the
province of the appellate courts to re-
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solve problems on a case-by-case basis.
The distinctions the law draws-between
economic and noneconomic damages,
and between plaintiffs injured by solvent
versus insolvent joint tortfeasors-are
not impermissible under the equal protection clause. There is a rational basis
for distinguishing economic from noneconomic damages, and for providing
more protection for the former. The
distinction between solvent and insolvent
tortfeasors is not one that the state
draws at all, but is simply fate in which
the state plays no role. The court's analysis in both issues draws heavily from
prior cases rejecting constitutional challenges to the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), the
medical liability tort limitations passed
in 1975.
On the issue of retroactivity, the
court was sharply split. Justices Arguelles, Mosk, Broussard and Panelli held
that the act did not apply to any cause
of action which accrued before the
effective date of the act. In so doing, the
court resolved a dispute between the
districts. The First District Court of
Appeal, in Russell v. Superior Court,
185 Cal.App.3d 810 (1986), held that
the law had no retroactive effect. In the
instant case, the Second District disagreed, holding that it applied to all
cases which had not yet gone to trial as
of the election date. The Supreme Court
examined in detail the language of the
measure, the supporting and opposing
ballot arguments, and the retroactivity
of similar limitations passed in other
states. The court found nothing in the
statute intended to make it retroactive;
under Civil Code section 3, and well
established caselaw, a statute is prospective only unless its plain language
declares otherwise. The court also found
no reference by the sponsors or in the
ballot arguments read by the voters to
suggest a retroactive intent.
The court also rejected policy arguments that because the initiative was
designed to address a perceived "crisis"
in liability insurance cost and availability, it must apply immediately to all
cases. The court noted that insurance
coverage for accidents that occurred before the passage of the act was already
bought and paid for on the basis of
joint and several liability; retroactive
application would do nothing but create
a "windfall" for insurance companies.
To the extent that the statute was intended to bring down premium costs or
increase liability insurance availability,
prospective application of the law provided all the protection that was needed
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to have these effects; retroactive application would have no impact whatsoever
on prospective insurance projections.
The court also relied on its prior
decision holding MICRA to be prospective only in effect, and decisions on
statutes from other states, all of which
were prospective in effect.
Citizens for Public Accountability v.
Desert Health Systems, Inc., et al.,
_Cal.3d__, 88 D.A.R. 6620,
No. S004970 (May 5, 1988).
Supreme Court Declines to Hear Case
to Resolve Conflict in Applicability of
Brown Act to PrivateCorporations
The California Supreme Court has
denied the petition for review filed by
private corporations that were ordered
to comply with the Brown Act after
they took over the operations of a public
"hospital district. The Fourth District's
decision in the instance case is in direct
conflict with the First District Court
of Appeal's decision in a similar case.
(See CRLR Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1988)
p. 128 and Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1987)
p. 112 for complete background information.)
The Supreme Court, in the same
order denying the hearing, ordered the
Fourth District's decision decertified for
publication under California Rule of
Court 976.
CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
California Trial Lawyers Association
v. March Fong Eu,
_Cal.App.3d___, 88 D.A.R. 4887,
No. C003936
(3d Dist., Apr. 15, 1988).
Insurance Industry Initiative Violates
the Single Subject Rule
The Court of Appeal for the Third
District held that an insurance initiative
sponsored by the Association of California Insurance Companies violates the
single subject rule in Article II, Section
8, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution. Calling the initiative "a
paradigm of potentially deceptive...
provisions," the court issued a writ
prohibiting the Secretary of State from
putting the initiative on the November
1988 ballot.
The California Trial Lawyers Asso-

ciation (CTLA) sought a writ of mandamus to prevent the Secretary of State
and Registrar of Voters from placing
the proposed insurance initiative on the
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ballot. The initiative, which is over 120
pages long and contains 67 sections,
called for the establishment of no-fault
insurance for auto accident injuries. The
proclaimed purpose of the initiative
under Section 3 is "'to control the cost
of insurance in California."' CTLA
claimed that an "inconspicuously"
placed section of the initiative was not
germane to the initiative's stated purpose. Section 8 of the initiative would:
(1) allow insurers to make unlimited
campaign contributions to public
officials; and (2) exempt public officials
from complying with laws that prohibit
them from participating in any decision
affecting their contributors.
The insurance companies requested
that the court defer consideration of the
merits until after the November 1988
election, citing Brosnahan v. Eu, a
single subject rule challenge to the 1982
"Victims' Bill of Rights." The court distinguished Brosnahan,wherein the Secretary of State had begun verifying
signatures and the Superior Court had
ordered the initiative placed on the
ballot before the Supreme Court rendered its decision, from the instant case
where the initiative was still in the signature gathering stage. Also, the court
ruled that because the initiative presented such a "palpable transgression of
the single-subject rule," its validity
should be determined before the November election.
The court held that an initiative's
"singleness may be determined by the
extent to which its provisions are germane to the general subject." The insurance companies argued that the section
could be tied to the stated purpose of
the initiative (reducing the costs of insurance) because it would guarantee the
insurance companies' right to participate
in the political process, thus reducing
costs to consumers. The court dismissed
this contention, stating that it is just
as likely that the insurance companies'
political participation will increase costs
to the consumer. The section which
would exempt public officials from disqualifying themselves from acting in
matters concerning their contributors
could not be explained as germane to
the stated purpose of the initiative by
the insurance companies or the court.
Finally, the court refused to delete
the section from the initiative, citing
Article II, Section 8(d) of the California
Constitution, which states that singlesubject violations cannot be cured by
severing them. The court ordered a writ
of mandate directing the Secretary of
State to disqualify the initiative.
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CALIFORNIA

SUPERIOR COURTS
American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations,
et al. v. Deukmejian, et al.,
No. 88-C-I 1393
(Sacramento Superior Court).
Labor Unions and Environmental
Groups Challenge Exemptions to
Proposition65for Food, Drugs,
and Cosmetics
A coalition of labor and environmental groups has filed suit challenging
Governor Deukmejian's grant of a wholesale exemption from compliance with
Proposition 65's warning requirements
for all food, drugs, and cosmetics sold
in California.
Proposition 65 was passed by the
voters at the November 1986 general
election. It requires, inter alia, that
consumers be provided with warnings
whenever a product contains a chemical
known to the state to cause cancer, birth
defects, or other reproductive harm.
The Governor appointed the Health and
Welfare Agency as the lead agency to
implement the law, including issuing
interpretive regulations.
The Agency did so, effective February 27, 1988. Included among them is a
"temporary" blanket exemption for all
food, drugs, and cosmetics from Proposition 65's warning requirements. According to the Deukmejian administration, so long as those products are
regulated by the federal government and
in compliance with federal regulations,
there is no need for Proposition 65
warnings. Proponents of the law counter
that Proposition 65 already exempts
any product from the warning requirement, if the manufacturer can establish
that the chemical is safe or is present
in amounts so small that the product is
safe. Therefore, they argue, if the
product is safe, it is already exempt and
needs no blanket exemption; conversely,
if the federal standards are too laxfederal regulations do not cover the full
range of chemicals addressed under
Proposition 65 and those that are covered are under different standards-then
Proposition 65 is needed because it
provides a higher level of protection.
The suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to establish there is no
authority for a blanket exemption. At
this writing, the matter has not been set
for hearing.
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